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Abstract
Established ￿rms often fail to maintain leadership following disrup-
tive market shifts. We argue that such ￿rms are more prone to internal
resistance. A radical adjustment of assets a⁄ects the distribution of em-
ployee rents, creating winners and losers. Losers resist large changes when
strong customer goodwill cushions the consequences. Partial adaptation
may lead winners to depart to form new ￿rms with no goodwill, but no
internal resistance.
1 Introduction
Often leading ￿rms fail to adjust to radical market and technology changes, and
new ￿rms emerge to seize the opportunities. This is puzzling. Leading ￿rms
should have precisely the human capital, ￿nancial resources and brand name
necessary to seize the opportunity. Yet evidence from case studies shows a pat-
tern of failure to adapt following radical innovation in the disk drive, steel, and
earth excavator industries (Christensen 1997, 1999), the laser industry (Klepper
and Sleeper 2005), the photolithographic and pharmaceutical industries (Hen-
derson (1993, 2006), and the post-deregulation US airline and trucking indus-
tries (Audia, Locke and Smith 2000). Leading ￿rms seem to struggle to respond
to large, disruptive changes. Conventional explanations focus on the reluc-
tance to relinquish strategies which earn rents on sunk investment, such as sales
cannibalization (Arrow, 1962). Management scientists argue that ￿ radical inno-
vations ... destroy the usefulness of the architectural knowledge of established
￿rms... (leading ￿rms) will often be adept at managing a process of incremental
improvement, but disruptive technologies which change the rules ... leave estab-
lished businesses with nowhere to go￿ (Clark and Henderson, 1990). But why, if
adaptation promises returns that exceed lost rents on sunk investment, should
successful organizations fails to adjust?
One explanation involves behavioural biases resulting from past success. Au-
dia, Locke and Smith (2000) cite internal satisfaction with performance levels,
con￿dence in past strategies, and avoidance of unfavourable information. Hen-
derson and Kaplan (2006) cite organizational inertia, procedural rigidity, and
1the di¢ culty of making large adjustments to working practices characterized by
extensive interdependencies. Several cases studied in the management litera-
ture point to resistance within the organization. Harley-Davidson was unable
to prevent Honda￿ s entry with smaller motorcycles, even though it made a com-
peting product, because its distributors did not want to market it (Christensen
1999). A leading disk-drive company failed to move to the new generation of
1.8" drives, as there was no incentive for employees to push a disruptive technol-
ogy (Christensen 1999). Geroski and Markides (2005) explain Xerox￿ s failure to
sustain innovation by the di¢ culty of creating support inside the organization.1
Internal opposition to radical change is understandable: major recon￿gura-
tion of ￿rm physical and human capital creates winners and losers. For instance,
the transition from ￿lm to digital photography entailed a switch in production
processes away from chemical engineering and towards computer skills. Em-
ployees who were chemical engineers stood to lose out in the process. But why
is it di¢ cult to promise compensation to those who stand to lose?
We assume that compensation of agents whose skills lose value is not ex-
post credible. Therefore losers may try to block, or at least limit, change by
refusing to cooperate. Yet this cannot explain resistance if private bene￿ts
are also undermined by reduced ￿rm value. Here we show that resistance is
credible when the ￿rm has signi￿cant intangible capital, or goodwill, arising
from a history of success.
We model three typical features of large ￿rms. First, skilled agents perform
complex and nonveri￿able tasks. This grants them non-contractible private
bene￿ts (for example by structuring asset use and tasks to suit themselves).2
Secondly, owners can rearrange ￿rm assets and strategies by ￿at, but cannot
force workers to adapt their behaviour to the new strategy. Most tasks require
coordination among agents with complementary expertises, so cooperation is
essential.3 Losers can adopt passive resistance, failing to adjust their actions to
the new asset con￿guration, in order to retain a larger share of bene￿ts. Finally,
output is noncontractible, so it cannot be pledged to losers.
We show that for small shifts, losers gain from change and do not oppose
it. Even with a reduced share, they prefer to share the larger pie. However,
when external change calls for a large recon￿guration, losers can credibly oppose
change, and force owners to limit adjustment to a compromise solution.4
How can a value-destroying threat be credible? In established ￿rms with
1Some companies have managed to overcome this di¢ culty, at the cost of splitting o⁄ the
new activity into a separate unit. HP did manage to enter the emerging inkjet market, but
they achieved this by setting up a completely separate division from laser printers, located
hundred of miles away (Christensen 1999). Another example is IBM￿ s choice to set up a
separate unit for its PC business (Henderson, 2006).
2For instance, the share of surplus enjoyed by computer specialists depends on the quality
and importance of hardware equipment and software in the ￿rm.
3Actions in a team are hard to measure (Holmstrom, 1982), and lack of cooperation in
highly complementary task execution is particularly ine¢ cient.
4Control rights over assets could be assigned to the agents with the ex ante critical invest-
ment (Grossman-Hart, 1986). Yet since external change alters the relative role of di⁄erent
skills, this may further increase resistance to change.
2strong intangible capital (goodwill), suboptimal production reduces pro￿tability
less. For example lower quality output may be sold at a high price thanks to
the ￿rm￿ s brand name. This leads to destruction of accumulated intangible
capital, and ideally it should be avoided by negotiation. Yet when output is not
contractible, winners cannot credibly compensate losers, who in turn cannot
commit not to oppose resistance ex-post.5
In this context, critical employees can force concessions. Resistance is in-
e¢ cient in terms of overall output, but rational for losers. To avoid passive
resistance, the ￿rm will respond by choosing partial adjustment to the changed
circumstances: they prefer to make a small adjustment that losers will cooper-
ate with, than to su⁄er disruption by attempting to force a large adjustment.
In the case of a radical change in the ￿rm￿ s environment, this implies a large
loss of potential value for winners.
When the change in external opportunities goes beyond a certain threshold,
there is a further e⁄ect. New ￿rms have no accumulated intangible capital, so
they also have no internal resistance: as a result, winners will leave old ￿rms to
form new ￿rms better able to adjust and capture market leadership.
To summarize, our analysis can explain why resistance to radical change is
greater in successful ￿rms, even by rational agents aware of the consequences
of insu¢ cient adaptation. We show that more succesful ￿rms (those with more
goodwill) are (i) more likely to make only a partial adaptation to change and
(ii) more likely to collapse and be replaced by new ￿rms.
1.1 Related literature
In the property rights view of the ￿rm (Hart, 1995), ￿rm owners control decisions
on alienable (physical) assets in response to external opportunities. However,
assets such as skilled human capital are inalienable in the sense that control
over them cannot be assigned by contract.6 Inalienable human capital in Hart
and Moore (1994) imposes a limit on the value of the ￿rm which may pledged,
producing a theoretical explanation for limited borrowing capacity.
In our model resistance to change arises from unavoidable ex-post haggling,
as in the rent-seeking view (Williamson 1981). A di⁄erence here is that author-
ity does not enable to dictate agents￿actions, enabling them to capture some
bene￿ts.7 This is in line with the comment by Hart and Moore (2008) that
ex-post e¢ cient renegotiation seems a poor description of what goes on inside
large ￿rms.
Critically, we assume output is not veri￿able. Since owners cannot promise
some fraction of output, they can neither discourage passive resistance by losers
nor departure by winners. In our model, owners are unable to resist non-
5We do not model how goodwill is formed; it could re￿ect either human or ￿nancial in-
vestment.
6Thus vertical integration can restrain rent-seeking only in the use of alienable capital,
such as physical assets (Gibbons, 2005).
7This ex post control, with its associated bene￿ts to employees, may be ex ante e¢ cient
to protect rents arising from ￿rm speci￿c investment.
3cooperation which takes advantage of intangible capital when non-cooperative
employees remain essential to production8, which allows them to protect existing
rents.
In Hart and Moore (2008), a credible threat to resist may arise from a
behavioural sense of entitlement, induced by expectations created by initial
contracts. It may be driven by beliefs or psychological utility. This leads to
non-cooperative behaviour or ￿shading,￿which resembles our notion of passive
resistance. Hart and Holmstrom (2009) show how such ￿shading￿undermines
cooperation within integrated ￿rms, and not only in market leaders.
A related approach focuses on struggles between divisions over contractible
allocation of resources (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2001). In Brusco and Panunzi
(2005), managers have weaker incentives in conglomerate ￿rms even in the ab-
sence of a power struggle, since they have lower private bene￿ts when they retain
less of their pro￿ts relative to stand alone ￿rms which do not experience ex-post
reallocation of surplus.
Our approach is related to issues studied in the political economy literature.
Acemoglu (2003) describes how oligarchic elites whose grip on the economy suf-
focates growth are not able to make credible promises to other social groups to
create better incentives, unless they agree to reduce their own political power.9
Nor can those who stand to gain once they obtain control commit to com-
pensating the previous elite . Thus the inability to share power and commit
to agreements undermines any Coasian solution. In Coate and Morris (1999),
trade protection leads to investment which in turn leads to increased demand
for future protection. This o⁄ers an explanation for persistence of ine¢ cient
policy, a form of status quo bias.
In a context of voting over policy choices, valuable radical change will be re-
sisted by voters under su¢ cient uncertainty over the identity of the winners and
losers (Dewatripont and Roland (1994), Fernandez and Rodrik (1994)). In such
cases, gradual change may be the sole strategy to cope with resistance, leading
to delayed reforms and loss of e¢ ciency. In the special case when individual
reforms have some positive interaction, partial change below some threshold
will not achieve critical mass and will fail (Roland and Verdier (1994), Shleifer,
Murphy and Vishny (1992)).
2 The Model
We assume that a ￿rm consists of two workers, with distinct but complemen-
tary expertise (such as production and sales) denoted by fw;lg. Ex-post the
owner captures all ￿rm income, which cannot be contracted upon. However,
the owner cannot control the output which accrues directly as private bene￿ts
to employees.
8They may also not be able to intervene when interference with skills undermines incentives
(Aghion and Tirole (1997), Gertner et al. (1994).
9In this literature there is a weaker presumption of ex-post e¢ ciency, as compared to
organisation theory where the Coase theorem operates as a benchmark.
4The ￿rm faces a shift in the technological frontier characterized by the para-
meter ￿MAX 2 (1
2;1].10 The higher is ￿MAX, the more radical is the potential
gain. The ￿rm adjusts its assets in response, choosing a con￿guration in the
newly feasible set ￿ 2 [1
2;￿MAX] (the status quo should be regarded as ￿ = 1
2):
A shift to ￿ > 1
2 favours one type of worker, type w (￿winner￿ ), who poten-
tially comes to enjoy a fraction ￿ of total employee surplus. However, this gain
is reduced if type l (￿loser￿ ) chooses not to adapt behaviour to the new asset
con￿guration.
Firm strategy represents the choice of real assets, which have di⁄erent skill
speci￿city and thus a⁄ect the division of private bene￿ts across skills. We as-
sume the asset choice is made by the winner: it is natural to assume that the
winner is critical for the new strategy, so his preferences matter more. However,
the analysis is very similar if, instead, one assumes asset choice is made by an
external owner; the necessary modi￿cations to our results are given in footnotes.
If the loser were in charge, he would choose a smaller adjustment.
After the assets are chosen, the loser chooses his action a. Full cooperation
where the action adjusts fully to the new asset con￿guration (a = ￿) ensures
maximum productivity. Partial cooperation means not adapting behaviour fully
to the new asset con￿guration, but enables the loser to maintain a share of
private bene￿ts equal to a.
Potential output equals ￿V (V; which measures the value of the new strategy,
is scaled up by the degree of adjustment ￿ chosen) with each agent getting a
share of output given by the loser￿ s action a: the winner gets a and loser gets
1 ￿ a. However, this is reduced by any dissonance between assets and loser
action a 6= ￿, which we call disruption. Disruption reduces output by creating






so that ￿ 2 [0;1]. Firms with a reputation for high quality su⁄er less, albeit
at the cost of a loss in intangible capital (goodwill). Let G denote the stock of
goodwill, which we interpret as customer loyalty.11 For future reference as a
measure of potential damage from resistance, we de￿ne p ￿ G
V .
2.1 Output with no resistance
V ￿ is the output if no resistance, with shares of output to w and l of ￿ and
(1 ￿ ￿) respectively: The individual payo⁄s are
Winner: ￿V ￿
Loser: (1 ￿ ￿)V ￿
10Purely as a reference, we consider that prior ￿rm strategy was based on an equal division
of ￿rm speci￿c assets. In the context of Hart and Moore (2007), any departure from this
initial equal divisions of rents would produce some irrational resistance (shading) by the loser.
11Goodwill may be de￿ned more broadly to include other bene￿ts, such as better access to
credit. In the model, establishing new ￿rms requires investing some resources. We assume
that any residual intangible capital at the end of the period is dissipated. In a dynamic context
owners would have a claim on it.
52.2 Resistance to change
When there is a mismatch ￿ between asset con￿guration and actions, there is a
probability of ￿breakdown,￿in which case the ￿rm￿ s output and sales rely only
on goodwill G. So expected sales are a weighted average of V ￿ and G: We use
￿ directly as the probability of breakdown, so sales are
￿G + (1 ￿ ￿)￿V (2)
We assume that G is smaller than ￿V in all relevant outcomes, which requires
V > 2G (so p < 1
2):Substituting for the de￿nition of ￿; the payo⁄ to the loser is
￿L(a;￿) = 1













(￿ ￿ a)G + (2a ￿ 1)(1 ￿ a)￿V
2￿ ￿ 1
(3)
while for the winner it is
￿W(a;￿) = 1













(￿ ￿ a)G + (2a ￿ 1)a￿V
2￿ ￿ 1
(4)
2.3 Loser￿ s response
After the winner has chosen the new asset con￿guration ￿, the loser chooses
whether to cooperate or resist. It turns out this choice depends on the degree
of asset change implemented, as well as the value of the potential change V
relative to goodwill G (recall that p = G
V :) The following Proposition establishes
that the loser cooperates for a moderate shift in asset con￿guration up to a
certain threshold, and responds to any further change by partial adaptation at
a decreasing rate.
Proposition 1 The loser cooperates completely with new strategies ￿ entailing
a moderate shift in asset con￿guration. The loser resists more radical change.
It is never optimal for the loser to block all the value gain from change: the
action a(￿) taken by the loser may be less than the winner￿ s choice of strategy
￿; but exceeds the existing benchmark 1
2: The point where the loser starts to









Beyond this point the loser￿ s action a(￿) increases with the chosen ￿ but less








6The proof is given in the Appendix (as are all proofs). Notice that ￿R is
the point at which ￿ = 3
4 ￿
p
4￿: This is the point at which resistance starts to
occur. ￿R ranges from 3
4 (when there is no goodwill; p = 0) towards 1
2(very
high goodwill, relative to the improvement generated by the new technology),
as shown in the ￿gure below.









Figure 1: threshold ￿R for resistance
We would expect ￿R to be decreasing in p : more goodwill makes resistance
more likely. We can also see that the loser never blocks change completely (it
is never optimal for the loser to choose a = 1
2; even when goodwill is very high,
there is a small interval where the new asset con￿guration is accepted). Also,
even when there is no goodwill, the loser always resists a big enough shift in
asset con￿guration (for a > 3
4; there is always resistance). This is because the
loser is willing to accept lower total output, and the risk of loss from disruption,
in return for retaining a higher share of output.
Beyond the point where resistance does occur, the loser responds to a higher
shift by partial adaptation at a decreasing rate: a(￿) is an increasing, concave
function with a slope less than 1. The following ￿gure shows the optimal loser
response a as a function of the winner￿ s choice of ￿ (equation (6)) (the ￿gure is
drawn for p = 1=8).









Figure 2: Loser￿ s best response.
2.4 Winner￿ s response
We now consider the winner￿ s decision. Resistance is doubly costly to the win-
ner: it transfers a greater share of bene￿ts to the loser, and creates a risk of
poor product quality. The winner must balance these costs against the value
gain associated with more change. It turns out in cases where the transfor-
mation in external circumstances is large enough to encounter resistance from
the loser (￿MAX > ￿R), the winner prefers to scale back the strategy to avoid
resistance.12
Proposition 2 The winner chooses the highest possible strategy, ￿ = ￿MAX;
in cases where this does not induce the loser to resist (￿MAX ￿ ￿R): When
￿MAX > ￿R, the winner chooses the maximum adjustment which avoids resis-
tance, so ￿ = a(￿) = ￿R:
Speci￿cally, the winner chooses
￿ = minf￿R;￿MAXg (7)
Note that as the largest value of ￿R is 3
4, the winner will never choose ￿ > 3
4, as
this would always encounter resistance. Also, for small external transformation
(small ￿MAX), change is implemented in full without resistance from the loser.
This result shows that the winner is better o⁄ accepting less radical change
which the loser cooperates with, rather than forcing more change which will
engender resistance. The loser would not block change completely beyond the
12If instead we assume that the decision on ￿ is made by an external owner of the ￿rm, it is
easy to see that the owner would make the same decsion. Beyond ￿R; the owner would face
the same trade-o⁄ as the winner except that the winner also reduces his output share with a
larger ￿: Therefore, if the winner prefers to reduce ￿ back to ￿R; so will the owner.
8point ￿R. However, the degree of partial resistance by the loser is severe enough
to deter the winner from seeking a larger change in the ￿rst place.
We can now state our main comparative static result.
Corollary 3 A ￿rm with more goodwill (higher p) faces a greater threat by the
losing skill to resist change. As a result, it will choose less adaptation to change.
The payo⁄for the winner is W(￿) = (￿MAX)2V when there is no resistance.


























2.5 New ￿rm creation
Suppose agents can start new ￿rms. We assume that the initiative may be taken
only by the winner, as his is now the most scarce talent.13 Firm creation costs
a ￿xed amount C: As a new ￿rm has no track record, it has no accumulated
goodwill. This may impose higher costs (for instance, it may reduce its access
to credit), and the parameter C includes these costs as well as other costs of
moving and setting up a new ￿rm. However, it also implies that the resistance
payo⁄ to the losers is lower. In a new ￿rm, the loser will agree with any asset
con￿guration in the range ￿ 2 (1
2; 3
4). This can be seen by setting G = p = 0
in the solution for ￿R given in the previous section. For any ￿ larger than 3
4
the loser would resist: the winner, anticipating this, prefers not to set ￿ > 3
4.




16 : More generally, and de￿ning
￿MAX = minf￿MAX; 3
4g; (9)
the winner￿ s payo⁄ in the new ￿rm is:
WNEW ￿ (￿MAX)2V ￿ C (10)





18V ￿ 16G + 6
p





When ￿MAX > ￿New; then winner leaves the ￿rm and starts a new ￿rm. As a
result, the established ￿rm collapses.
13It is straightforward to assume instead that an external owner makes the decision. Details
are given in a subsequent footnote.
9Note that ￿New > ￿R: Also, ￿New is strictly decreasing in G and increasing
in C. This is intuitive because goodwill makes the existing ￿rm less pro￿table
for the winner, so lowers the threshold at which he leaves to start a new ￿rm.
On the other hand a higher cost of starting a new ￿rm makes starting a new ￿rm
less attractive and raises this threshold. Note that in the range ￿MAX > ￿New,
it would be in the interests of the loser to commit not to oppose as much
resistance. However, following any asset shift larger than ￿R, he will ex-post
￿nd it optimal to choose an action a lower than ￿.
Note also that lack of goodwill does not eliminate the power of weaker skill.
As long as the loser remains indispensable to the production process, some rents
have to be left to it. Furthermore, a very high recon￿guration ￿ > 3
4 which shifts
almost all surplus to the winning skill is impossible.
Indeed, the winner￿ s return may be higher if he is able to demand up front
some of the value of the ex-post bene￿ts enjoyed by the employee with the loser
skill. We could assume that this is so, and that they have some bargaining
power ￿:14 If ￿ 2 (0;1] they can extract a fraction of the loser￿ s surplus by
requiring them to pay an up-front fee.15 We could modify the above analysis
to allow for this possibility. The winner￿ s payo⁄ in the new ￿rm would then be:
WNEW ￿ (￿MAX)2V ￿ C + ￿(1 ￿ ￿MAX)￿MAXV: (12)
and the statement of Proposition (4) could be modifed accordingly.
As in the previous analysis, Proposition (4) can readily adapted if we assume
instead that the decision to start a new ￿rm is made by an external owner.16
To summarize the results, the best ￿rms will collapse in the face of radical
change, because they face an upper bound on the degree of adaptation that is
feasible. Winners then leave established ￿rms, where limited adjustment reduces
their own return, and start new ￿rms.
3 Conclusions
Adjustment to radical change requires major recon￿guration of ￿rm strategies,
and redeployment of assets dedicated to di⁄erent skills. Goodwill, a measure
of accumulated intangible capital, increases the bargaining power of the losing
skill by scaling up what they receive if they refuse to cooperate. The higher
goodwill is, the harder it is to achieve an e¢ cient level of change.17 Thus, a
14It would be reasonable to assume that this bargaining power re￿ects the degree of relative
skill scarcity, presumably increasing in the industry shift ￿MAX: For simplicity, we assume ￿
is exogenous.
15Ex- ante, before they have joined the ￿rm, there are many losers in competition to join
the ￿rm. However, ex-post, once they have joined, the losers are able to extract a share of
the surplus.
16If instead we assume the decision to start a new ￿rm is made an external owner, the











17This mirrors Acemoglu￿ s (2003) analysis of the level of investment when neither rulers nor
citizens can commit to a compensation scheme.
10critical weakness of leading ￿rms in the face of radical change (not change per
se) is precisely the stock of intangible capital, which keeps up the value of ￿rm
output upon resistance.
Compromise change implies a loss of productive opportunity but it is ￿ polit-
ically feasible￿because it leaves enough bene￿ts to the losing skill. As it reduces
the surplus available to those whose skills have become more valuable, they
may leave to set up new ventures, where resistance is weaker because failure to
cooperate produces less value. A leading ￿rm may thus collapse as new ￿rms
are set up, creating discontinuity in industry dynamics.
Our notion of resistance is related to the notion of shading in Hart and
Moore (2008), though it is based on a rational choice when output is veri￿able.
As actions in a team are hard to measure (Holmstrom, 1982), in our approach
this grants signi￿cant bargaining power to employees with highly complementary
expertise.
An interesting question for future research is what gives rise to goodwill.
Goodwill is related to the past success of the ￿rm at pleasing its consumers.
While owners in principle own the ￿rm￿ s intangible assets, its future value is at
the mercy of hard-to-replace employees. Yet if goodwill re￿ ects value accumu-
lated from intangible human capital dedicated to the ￿rm, as when it re￿ ects
quality and knowledge of workers, its value is correlated with past sunk invest-
ment by employees. The question of intangible capital seems thus to deserve
more attention by researchers.
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5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The loser chooses a 2 [1
2;￿] to maximize his payo⁄ ￿L(a;￿): Note from





G ￿ 3V ￿ + 4V a￿
2￿ ￿ 1
: (13)









2￿￿1 > 0: Thus a = 1
2 (maximal resistance) is never an optimal choice for the
loser. Next we study when some resistance is optimal for the loser by examining
@￿L(a;￿)




G ￿ 3V ￿ + 4V ￿2
2￿ ￿ 1
(14)
which is negative if some resistance is optimal (a < ￿). If is positive, the
constraint a ￿ ￿ binds and the loser chooses not to resist.. This occurs when
G ￿ 3V ￿ + 4V ￿2 < 0; equivalently ￿(4￿ ￿ 3) < ￿p: De￿ne ￿R as the solution









As ￿(4￿ ￿ 3) is increasing, for ￿ < ￿R the loser does not resist and for ￿ >
￿R there is resistance. Next consider the ￿rst order condition for an interior
solution (i.e. ￿ > ￿R) by setting
@￿L(a;￿)









4V ￿2;which is positive, less than 1
2and decreasing in ￿ over
(1
2;1): This implies that the loser response to more change in this range is















5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The winner￿ s payo⁄ is
￿W(a;￿) =
(￿ ￿ a)G + (2a ￿ 1)a￿V
2￿ ￿ 1




Full Cooperation: Plainly, for ￿MAX ￿ ￿R, the winner should choose
￿ = ￿MAX because there will be no resistance.
Potential Resistance: When ￿MAX > ￿R, the winner￿ s payo⁄ changes if
he chooses ￿ > ￿R. As the loser will respond with a(￿) = (3
4 ￿
p
4￿), the winner￿ s
payo⁄ becomes
￿W(a(￿);￿) =
(￿ ￿ a(￿))G + (2a(￿) ￿ 1)a(￿)￿V
2￿ ￿ 1













= (1 ￿ 2a)




4V ￿2(2￿ ￿ 1)
(G + V ￿ ￿ 4V a￿)
=
4V ￿2 (1 ￿ 2a)(V a ￿ G) ￿ G(2￿ ￿ 1)(G + V ￿ ￿ 4V a￿)
4V ￿2 (2￿ ￿ 1)
2
= ￿
3(4￿ + 1)(8￿ ￿ 1)
8V ￿2 (2￿ ￿ 1)
2 :
It is easy to see that it is negative, so the winner chooses not to force change in
excess of ￿ = ￿R:
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. As the winner payo⁄ in a new ￿rm is (￿MAX)2V ￿C; the winner leaves
when
(￿MAX)2V ￿ C ￿
V
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18V ￿ 16G + 6
p






18V ￿ 16G + 6
p
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